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The Metaphysics of Relations is an anthology of thirteen original papers 
plus an introduction, addressing the philosophical issue of relations 
from a contemporary and historical perspective. The result is a re-
markably coherent whole, where the different papers shed light on 
each other even though very few of them explicitly address intercon-
nections. As a consequence, the book works really well as an intro-
duction to the philosophical issue on relations, while the individual 
papers represent cutting edge research on the particular issues that 
they focus on. The mix of contemporary and historical perspectives 
means you get a snapshot view of the contemporary issues, as well as 
insights into their historical development.
Scaltsas (ch. 2), Brower (ch. 3), and Penner (ch. 4), offer a more 
nuanced understanding of the views on relations in Plato, Aristotle, 
and the Medieval Philosophers. They refute the popular view that 
philosophers before the 20th Century “did not—perhaps even could 
not—properly appreciate the reality of irreducibility of relations” 
(Brower, p. 36). Partly by showing that those who denied that there 
were mind-independent relations didn’t do so because they didn’t 
have a grasp of the notion, and partly by showing that some early phi-
losophers did admit the reality of irreducible relations. Plato allowed 
that there could be two individuals that together partook in Forms 
that neither of them did individually. Simmias and Hippias, although 
not courageous individually, can be so when acting together. Scalt-
sas, Brower, and Penner demonstrate that there is a greater continu-
ity in the philosophical discussion about relations from ancient times 
until today, than is popularly appreciated.
Donnelly (ch. 5) takes us through the details of Positionalism. In 
order to answer some worries about how positionalism copes with 
symmetric relations, Donnelly proposes a revised version, which she 
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calls Relative Positionalism. The solution involves an appeal to a primi-
tive notion of relative property instantiation. The editors Marmo-
doro and Yates think that this primitive notion is roughly Aristote-
lian, which again indicates the historical continuity of the debate.
Lowe (ch. 6) and Simons (ch. 7) both arrive at the conclusion 
that there are no irreducible relations. They agree that, predication 
of internal relations is a case of formal predication, where no genu-
ine property is attributed in addition to the intrinsic properties the 
objects already possess. Real relations, if any there be, must there-
fore be external relations. However, the prime candidates for being 
external relations, i.e. causal and spatiotemporal relations, turn out 
be internal relations on closer inspection. The difference between 
Lowe and Simons is in what they take to be the fundamental constit-
uents of reality, and hence the proper subjects of predication. Lowe 
thinks substances are basic, while Simons thinks processes are basic. 
On their view, since there are no plausible candidates of external 
relations, we should suspect that the very notion of irreducible rela-
tional properties is incoherent.
Heil (ch. 8), and Yates (ch. 9) continue the discussion of whether 
causal relations are internal or external, but now from the perspec-
tive of powers-based accounts. Heil concludes that they are internal 
relations, so ends up with a position very close to that of Lowe and 
Simons. Yates, on the other hand argues that there is a tension in the 
way powers are characaterised as intrinsic to their bearers and yet 
essentially related to other powers, which in the end does not allow 
of reduction of causal relations to a form of internal relation.
Berenstein (ch. 10), Ladyman (ch. 11), and Briceño and Mumford 
(ch. 12) discuss structuralism, i.e. in what sense we could think of 
the nature of properties as grounded in network of relations to other 
properties and not as intrinsic to the individual. Berenstein and La-
dyman attempt to develop structuralism. Berentstein suggests that 
a structuralist account of properties cannot rely only on causal rela-
tions, but must also consider a property’s mathematical and nomo-
logical higher-order features. Ladyman attempts to provide a natu-
ralist basis for structuralism by illustrating how physics makes use of 
irreducible relational features to explain various natural phenomena. 
Briceño and Mumford are critical of the project. They accuse ontic 
structural realism for requiring the reality of relations without relata, 
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and therefore ends up describing reality as an abstract Platonic entity.
Finally we have Esfeld (ch. 13) and Dorato (ch. 14) discussing 
which lessons to draw from Quantum Physics. I won’t venture to say 
too much about what those lessons are, because I really struggle with 
Quantum Physics. It is worth mentioning though that Esfeld is one 
of the few to explicitly relate to other chapters of the book—well, to 
those who address the contemporary issues anyway—and attempts 
to sketch a middle way between the position that there are no funda-
mental relations (Lowe, Simons, and Heil), and the view that rela-
tions are fundamental to everything else (Berenstein and Ladyman). 
This is an excellent book, which has greatly enriched my under-
standing of the metaphysics of relations. Alas, my role as reviewer is 
not just to praise but also to be critical. My main complaint is that the 
book provides a background against which Ingvar Johansson’s neo-
Aristotelian ‘hypo-realism’ about relations is absent (cf. ‘Hypo-real-
ism with respect to relations’, in The Metaphysics of Relations, ed. by F. 
Clementz and J-M. Monnoyer, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2011; and 
‘Scattered exemplification and many-place copulas’, Axiomathes 23: 
235–46, 2013). For my own part, hypo-realism—like Sartre’s ‘ab-
sent Pierre’— appears absent because I was looking for it. But, I sus-
pect that for readers who aren’t familiar with Johansson’s work, then 
reading The Metaphysics of Relations will still leave them with one ques-
tion (or, it should); why would relations not be mind-independently 
real if all there is are the relata and their intrinsic properties? The 
editors formulate this core theme in the following way in the Preface:
It is uncontroversial that there are true relational predications—
‘Abelard loves Eloise’ […] ‘Derby is between Sheffield and Coven-
try’[…] ‘smoking causes cancer’, and so forth. More controversial is 
whether any true relational predications have irreducibly relational 
truthmakers. Do any of the statements above involve their subjects 
jointly instantiating polyadic properties, or can we explain their truths 
solely in terms of monadic, non-relational properties of the relata? 
(Marmodoro and Yates, vii)
The assumption running through most of the volume is that if the 
expression ‘Simmias is larger than Socrates’ is true simply in virtue 
of the existence of Simmias and Socrates respectively, each having 
a certain size, then we don’t have two subjects jointly instantiating 
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a polyadic property ‘larger than’; we only have Simmias having one 
size, and Socrates having another. I struggle to see why this should be 
the conclusion. I am tempted to think that the criteria for something 
to count as real and irreducible are set too high, so that in effect the 
only way for there to be real polyadic properties is if they can obtain 
in two or more relata independently of any intrinsic properties the 
objects may have.
The fact that relations depend for their existence and reality upon 
non-relational entities and their monadic properties—which is what 
Briceño and Mumford call the standard view of relations (p. 198)—
doesn’t automatically make them non-existent, reducible, or merely 
subjective, does it? Surely, if there is only Simmias and his size, he is 
not larger than anything. For Simmias to be larger than something, 
something else has to be instantiated, and that something else has to 
have a size. Hence ‘larger than’ only exists in so far as there exist two 
things with each a different size, and yet we need nothing more than 
the things and their sizes.
I take Johansson to argue that with the existence of two things and 
their sizes, we get the relation “for free” and yet we have something 
more than two unrelated things and their sizes. Johansson takes him-
self to be doing little more than pointing out that even though rela-
tives “belong to the least substantial of all the categories and are pos-
terior to quality and quantity” (Aristotle, Metaphysica book 14: 1088a) 
then they are still substantial. They exist in the very same way every-
thing else does, but they are not as fundamental as everything else.
Now, I suspect that something like the concern I gave voice to 
is what Briceño and Mumford have in mind when they complain of 
Ontic Structural Realism that it requires the possibility of relations 
without relata (p. 198), but as far as I can see they do not tie this 
concern to the general idea of what it would take for an irreducibly 
real relation to obtain.
It is also possible that I have misunderstood the ultimate concern 
here. Maybe the question is whether there are irreducible fundamental 
relations, while I have been thinking of whether relations are mind-
independently real. If that is the case, then I can only complain that 
this isn’t stressed consistently throughout the book. Whatever is the 
case, I wholeheartedly recommend this volume as essential reading 
for anyone who wants to feel on top of the metaphysics of relations.
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William Clare Roberts’ recent book, Marx’s Inferno: The Political Theory 
of Capital, provides a novel and interesting interpretation of the first 
volume of Marx’s masterpiece. Roberts argues, controversially, that 
Volume 1 of Capital presents a stand-alone piece of political theory. 
His two over-arching theses are that (1) Capital Volume 1 aspired to 
provide “the definitive analysis of what’s wrong with capitalism” and 
(2) that this is based “on rewriting Dante’s Inferno as a descent into 
the modern ‘social Hell’ of the capitalist mode of production” (p. 
1). He does this in part by emphasising the many different strands 
of socialist theory that Marx was responding to, which include an 
important and oft-overlooked strain of radical republican thought. It 
is clear, well-researched, original, and well worth reading for anyone 
with an interest not only in Marx and Marxist political theory, but 
in freedom, domination, republicanism, and critiques of capitalist 
economic institutions as well.
Roberts begins by arguing that Volume 1 of Marx’s Capital be read 
and understood as essentially a work of political theory on its own, 
independently of the other two volumes and Marx’s work thereon, 
and thereafter arguing that Marx modelled the structure of Capital 
Volume 1 on that of Dante’s Inferno. Roberts’ thesis has elicited a 
well-known debate with David Harvey, who argues that the three 
volumes of Marx’s Capital can only be understood as a whole, partly 
because Marx’s full political economy of capitalism only comes to 
fruition with Volumes 2 and 3. However, I think it’s worth making 
the point that even if, like Harvey, we want to argue contra Roberts 
that Marx is developing a theory of political economy in Capital, and 
that that theory can only properly be understood by reading all three 
